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ABSTRACT
Infectious disease outbreaks pose major threats to human
health and security. Countries with robust capacities
for preventing, detecting and responding to outbreaks
can avert many of the social, political, economic and
health system costs of such crises. The Global Health
Security Index (GHS Index)—the first comprehensive
assessment and benchmarking of health security and
related capabilities across 195 countries—recently found
that no country is sufficiently prepared for epidemics
or pandemics. The GHS Index can help health security
stakeholders identify areas of weakness, as well as
opportunities to collaborate across sectors, collectively
strengthen health systems and achieve shared public
health goals. Some scholars have recently offered
constructive critiques of the GHS Index’s approach to
scoring and ranking countries; its weighting of select
indicators; its emphasis on transparency; its focus on
biosecurity and biosafety capacities; and divergence
between select country scores and corresponding COVID19-associated caseloads, morbidity, and mortality. Here,
we (1) describe the practical value of the GHS Index; (2)
present potential use cases to help policymakers and
practitioners maximise the utility of the tool; (3) discuss the
importance of scoring and ranking; (4) describe the robust
methodology underpinning country scores and ranks;
(5) highlight the GHS Index’s emphasis on transparency
and (6) articulate caveats for users wishing to use GHS
Index data in health security research, policymaking and
practice.

INTRODUCTION
The Global Health Security Index (GHS
Index) is a project by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative and the Johns Hopkins University
Center for Health Security, with methodological, research, and analytical support from
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). An
International Panel of Experts, convened
by the project team, provided guidance and
feedback on the development of the GHS
Index framework. Members of the International Panel of Experts provided advice over

Summary box
►► Infectious disease outbreaks pose major threats to

human health and economies.
►► The Global Health Security Index (GHS Index) can

help decision makers identify weaknesses in systems for preventing, detecting and responding to
outbreaks, while also considering relevant social,
political and environmental risk factors.
►► Using publicly available information, the GHS Index
documents where health security capacities are
strong and where they are weak.
►► GHS Index scores and ranks are entry points into
deeper analyses of health system capacities and
performance.
►► GHS Index scores cannot and do not predict how
countries respond to outbreaks, nor how many cases or deaths a country will report during an outbreak.
►► Future iterations of the GHS Index will incorporate
lessons learnt from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

the course of the GHS Index’s development
and participated in their personal capacities
or in their capacities as representatives of
advising organizations.” The inaugural iteration of the GHS Index was generously funded
by the Open Philanthropy Project, the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation and the Robertson
Foundation.
The GHS Index is the first comprehensive
assessment of health security and related capabilities across the 195 countries that make up
the States Parties to the International Health
Regulations (IHR (2005)). It promotes
meaningful multisectoral engagement to
complement existing processes for national
health security needs assessment, prioritisation, planning and financing, and is a tool
for measuring country capacities to prevent,
detect and respond to naturally occurring,
accidental and deliberate infectious disease
threats. Building on the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Joint External Evaluation
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The value proposition of the Global
Health Security Index

BMJ Global Health

THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF THE GHS INDEX
The GHS Index could serve as a powerful tool for measuring and motivating sustainable financing at national,
regional and global levels, and its findings could help
catalyse political will to fill gaps in health security capacity.
The GHS Index also measures indicators directly related
to epidemic and pandemic preparedness alongside
indicators of broader strengths needed to reinforce
health systems, such as political, security and socioeconomic factors that could shape country risk landscapes
and capacities to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to
outbreaks. Additionally, it complements ongoing efforts
to build accountability for national preparedness, such as
the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, the Global
Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and the World Bank
Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Multi-
Donor Fund.5
The GHS Index also aggregates otherwise scattered
qualitative and quantitative data into a consolidated,
publicly available format that facilitates comparison and
monitoring, and provides extensive documentation of
expert-vetted health security capacities and capabilities.
GHS Index data are thus a valuable complement to after
action reviews, JEEs and workshops to develop National
Action Plans for Health Security (NAPHS), as well as
for drawing comparisons across geographies at the level
of both individual questions and categories. With data
collection activities pending for the next iteration of the
GHS Index, we hope to eventually be able to monitor
2

national, regional and global trends in health security-
strengthening efforts over time, identify when countries
deprioritise investments and capacities and include new
measures of pandemic preparedness informed by global
experiences with COVID-19. Globally and nationally,
the GHS Index also identifies existing vulnerabilities in
preparedness for biological threats. Systematically cataloguing and monitoring these weaknesses could help
inform budget allocations and spending decisions, and
aid policymakers in setting priorities for health security-
strengthening and health systems-strengthening efforts.
Finally, the GHS Index is valuable in its framing of
global health security as a multisectoral social project.
Effective outbreak prevention, for example, depends in
part on addressing root causes of disease emergence, such
as those captured in GHS Index indicators examining
land use changes, veterinary workforces and agricultural
practices. This multisectoral lens—which incorporates
measures of country fragility and other political, economic
and environmental vulnerabilities—creates a tangible
starting point for One Health coordination platforms or
national disaster management committees to work across
sectors, engage non-traditional partners and formulate
multisectoral solutions to complex health challenges.
Though processes like JEEs and NAPHS development
are intended to be multisectoral, it is the health sector
that most often functions as the entry point for other
stakeholders and sectors that may not have explicit
mandates to strengthen health security.6 The GHS Index
thus recognises—and measures—the benefits of whole-
of-society approaches to health security that transcend
any one sector.

THE VALUE OF SCORING AND RANKING
Scoring is an intuitive method of summarising complex
health system capacities across diverse contexts, monitoring longitudinal and cross-sectional trends and advocating for needed policy change. Scoring is also used
widely across many areas of global health, economic,
policy and development research, as well as in established
health security evaluation tools like the JEE.7–10
In general, scoring is an effective method for measuring,
motivating and monitoring efforts to strengthen infectious disease management capacities across high-income,
middle-income and low-income settings alike. The Africa
Leaders Malaria Alliance, for example, produces scorecards that track country progress in improving financing,
capacity-
building and increasing coverage of health
services for malaria, neglected tropical diseases and
malnutrition.11 And, between 2012 and 2016, publication
of scores from the Nuclear Security Index (produced by
the Nuclear Threat Initiative and developed with EIU)
encouraged 10 countries to remove or dispose of highly
enriched uranium within their territories.12 The Human
Development Index has similarly emerged as a valuable tool for guiding decision making and monitoring
Ravi SJ, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e003648. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003648
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(JEE) tool, the GHS Index also assesses health system
preparedness for high-consequence outbreaks, as well as
socioeconomic and political risk factors that modulate
vulnerability to epidemic threats. The inaugural GHS
Index, released in 2019, found that no country is sufficiently prepared for epidemics or pandemics.1
COVID-19 and other recent outbreaks—such as H1N1
pandemic influenza, Ebola, Nipah and Zika, among
others—underscore the importance of measuring and
monitoring country progress towards building robust
capacities for preventing, detecting and responding to
known, emerging and re-
emerging infectious disease
threats.2 These outbreaks have also underscored challenges in measuring global health security capacities.
Some analyses, for example, have recently highlighted
discrepancies observed in countries like the USA and the
UK, which received high GHS Index and JEE Scores, yet
struggle to suppress cases of COVID-19.3 4
Here, we (1) describe the practical value of the GHS
Index; (2) present potential use cases to help policymakers and practitioners maximise the utility of the
tool; (3) discuss the importance of scoring and ranking;
(4) describe the robust methodology underpinning
country scores and ranks; (5) highlight the GHS Index’s
emphasis on transparency and (6) articulate caveats for
users wishing to use GHS Index data in health security
research, policymaking and practice.

BMJ Global Health

A ROBUST, PRACTITIONER-INFORMED METHODOLOGY
Data for each of the GHS Index’s 34 indicators and 85
sub-indicators were either sourced from existing repositories stewarded by reputable groups like WHO, or qualitatively assessed by EIU researchers. Qualitative data
were scored on a binary or categorical scale. To minimise
researcher bias and subjectivity in scoring, we employed
binary indicators wherever possible. Measurements were
normalised on a 0–100 scale to facilitate reproducible
cross-country, cross-indicator and cross-category comparison. Detailed justifications, sources and scoring criteria
are provided for each indicator in the GHS Index model,
report and website to ensure both appropriate contextualisation and reproducibility.
Data review and validation comprised a year-
long
process involving multiple researchers vetting scores,
data and justifications in stages to ensure consistency
across countries. The model’s default ‘expert’ weights
were derived from extensive deliberation and input from
Ravi SJ, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e003648. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003648

the GHS Index International Panel of Experts, a group of
21 subject matter experts in health security representing
organizations in 13 countries.16 However, recognising that
no single weighting scheme can reflect every country’s
priorities, we also built flexibilities into the GHS Index
model: users can customise weights based on context-
specific considerations, priorities or other criteria, and
country scores and rankings adjust accordingly.
SELECTING AND HARMONISING METRICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH
SECURITY
The GHS Index conceptualises a health security capacity
as a state’s ability or potential to carry out a discrete public
health or healthcare function necessary to prevent,
detect or respond to acute infectious disease threats,
be they naturally occurring, accidental or deliberate.
Featured indicators in the GHS Index are intended to aid
users in monitoring and measuring the investments and
processes that enable states to build, sustain and implement these capacities. The GHS Index does not, however,
purport to forecast health outcomes or impacts resulting
from country investments in strengthening health security capacities.
Some have asserted that the indicators selected for
inclusion in the GHS Index may reflect a systematic bias
towards higher-income countries.17 Given that national
gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita
correlate only weakly with overall GHS Index scores—as
evidenced by Pearson’s r values of 0.37 and 0.45, respectively—this seems unlikely. Fidler writes, however, that
global health security ‘ultimately depends on the quality
of national public health systems.’18 As such, we have
taken care to include indicators in the GHS Index that
measure material determinants of country-level health
security capacities, such as preparedness spending—
which do correlate strongly with national income.
However, the GHS Index also incorporates social,
political, technical and environmental determinants
of health security, which do not necessarily correlate
directly with national income level alone. On measures
of healthcare access (Indicator 4.3), for example, the
first-ranking, second-ranking and fifth-ranking countries
were Thailand (upper-middle-income), Georgia (lower-
middle-income) and Nigeria (lower-middle-income),
respectively. Other factors, such as strength of laboratory systems (Indicator 2.1) and international commitments (Indicator 5.3), also correlate more strongly with
overall GHS Index scores (r=0.80 and 0.76, respectively)
than with overall GDP (r=0.25 and 0.23, respectively). To
further prevent potential confounding by income level,
users might consider comparing overall, indicator and
sub-indicator-level scores across countries within a given
income group and adjusting model weights to align
more closely with the specific health priorities of a given
country or region.
Moreover, indicators were developed with the aim
of ensuring the GHS Index’s integration with existing
3

BMJ Glob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003648 on 8 October 2020. Downloaded from http://gh.bmj.com/ on October 21, 2020 by guest. Protected by copyright.

policymaking at both national and subnational levels in
many countries.8
In this vein, the GHS Index provides high-
level
composite scores for each country and offers considerable granularity and transparency in scoring justifications
at the indicator and sub-indicator levels, with the aim of
helping decision makers pinpoint discrete capacities
that require strengthening. Notably, GHS Index scores
have been used by some countries to create new metrics
of health security. For example, Malaysia’s Ministry of
Science, Technology and Innovation—in collaboration
with PEMANDU Associates and the Sunway Group—has
developed a Global COVID-19 Recovery Index (GCI).
GCI Scores are calculated from dynamic estimates of
confirmed cases and death rates by country (which
receive a weight of 70%), along with static measures
of prevention capacities (GHS Index, category 1) and
public health vulnerability (GHS Index, Indicator 6.5),
which receive a weight of 30%.13
Like scoring, ranking is an effective way to galvanise
change in low-performing countries and identify outliers,
such as countries that score unexpectedly well despite
limited resources, or those that rank poorly despite
undertaking capacity-building efforts. Outliers, in turn,
should prompt deeper analyses of such findings.14 Morse
writes, too, that ‘the ‘league table’ style of presenting
rankings is…meant to be picked up by the media, and
through them the public, non-government organisations,
pressure groups, aid agencies and so on, and ultimately
provide pressure on decision makers to bring about
positive change.’15 Regardless of their overall score and
rank, all countries—including high-performing states—
should examine specific GHS Index indicators closely
as a means of identifying critical weaknesses to address
through capacity-building, funding, legislation or other
approaches (see the Considerations for GHS Index users
section).

BMJ Global Health

CONSIDERATION OF BIOSECURITY, BIOSAFETY, HEALTH
SYSTEMS AND CATASTROPHIC THREATS
The GHS Index treats biosafety and biosecurity as vital
components of global health security. As such, the tool
includes numerous indicators measuring country capacities in these areas. Admittedly, health priorities in many
low/middle-income countries (LMICs) often differ from
those of their wealthier counterparts, and many LMICs
may have limited capacities to prioritise biosafety and
biosecurity.17 However, the health and security risks
associated with dual-use research, accidental releases of
pathogens and deliberate misuse of biological materials
are not equitably distributed across countries. LMICs
are more likely to experience significant morbidity and
mortality if these threats manifest, and unless steps are
taken to monitor and strengthen their respective biosecurity and biosafety capacities, they will remain disproportionately vulnerable.
The GHS Index’s approach to biosecurity and biosafety
aligns with that of the IHR (2005), which require core
health system competencies that apply universally to all
countries regardless of income level. It is worth noting,
too, that while category 1 of the GHS Index includes many
biosecurity and biosafety indicators, it is not weighted
more heavily than other categories: category 1 scores as
a whole account for only 16.3% of a country’s total score,
while scores for biosecurity and biosafety indicators each
determine approximately 2.6% of a country’s overall
score. Including these indicators in the GHS Index also
aligns with international health security norms, such as
4

those articulated in the IHR (2005), the JEE, the World
Organisation for Animal Health’s Performance of Veterinary Services Evaluations, the GHSA, the Biological
Weapons Convention and the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and
Prevention has also prioritised these capacities through
its continent-wide Initiative on Strengthening Biosafety
and Biosecurity, which aligns with both the JEE and IHR
implementation.21
The GHS Index also measures domains not explicitly
captured in other health security assessment tools, such as
health system readiness and preparedness for global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs). The Johns Hopkins
Center for Health Security defines GCBRs as ‘events in
which biological agents—whether naturally emerging or
reemerging, deliberately created and released or laboratory engineered and escaped—could lead to sudden,
extraordinary, widespread disaster beyond the collective
capability of national and international governments and
the private sector to control.’22 While the JEE’s biosafety
and biosecurity indicators are undoubtedly vital metrics
of GCBR preparedness, some health system capacities
not sufficiently captured in the tool—such as abilities
to test, approve and dispense new medical countermeasures—are also essential to GCBR prevention and mitigation. The GHS Index goes above and beyond the JEE
in this regard, featuring a dedicated category focusing
exclusively on health system capacities required to mitigate epidemic threats. This was the lowest-scoring category across all countries in the GHS Index: 131 countries
ranked in the lowest tier of scores, highlighting critical
vulnerabilities in global capacities to care for sick patients
and protect health workers during public health emergencies, including GCBRs.1 A comprehensive list of
GHS Index indicators measuring GCBR preparedness is
provided in the inaugural report.1

TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRATION WITH THE JEE
Transparency is a cornerstone of global cooperation
around health security capacity-building and emergency
response. It enables decision makers to track how global
health initiatives are financed, detect and respond quickly
to emergent outbreaks, coordinate responses with international partners and ensure accountability in public–
private partnerships.23–27 COVID-19 has recently reaffirmed the importance of transparency in case reporting,
surveillance and containment, especially as countries
take steps to resume routine economic, social and educational activities. Transparency in scientific practice has
also proven crucial during COVID-19. For example, open
exchanges of clinical data, biological samples, genetic
sequence data, modelling parameters and assumptions
and epidemiological data support evidence-based policymaking around reopening schools and economies, forecasting demand for healthcare services and equitable
allocation of scarce resources.28–31
Ravi SJ, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e003648. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003648
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global health security assessment tools and frameworks
such as the GHSA, the JEE and the IHR Monitoring and
Evaluation Framework, as well as the NAPHS development process, as Razavi et al recommend. However, other
scholars have highlighted a need for global health security metrics that do not simply mirror global patterns of
wealth distribution, and that more accurately capture
health system functionality and performance rather than
capacity alone.19 20 Though the GHS Index does extrapolate beyond the metrics featured in the aforementioned
frameworks to encompass novel measures of risk, vulnerability and health system readiness, its primary goals
remain (1) supporting and enhancing existing health
security-strengthening mechanisms in a comprehensive,
accessible format; and (2) motivating decision makers in
all countries to make needed investments in epidemic
and pandemic preparedness.
Thus, while more meaningful metrics of health security
capacity are certainly warranted and merit deeper consideration by the international community, we contend that
developing these metrics supersedes the original intention of the GHS Index to leverage existing, publicly available data. However, as we learn from COVID-19, we do
plan to revise the GHS Index Framework to include new,
more targeted measures of pandemic readiness (see the
Next steps section).

BMJ Global Health

LEADERSHIP, POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISKS, AND TRUST IN
GOVERNMENT
Some experts have rightly observed an inverse relationship between overall GHS Index scores and suboptimal COVID-19 outcomes in some high-income countries—most notably, the USA, which despite having the
highest overall GHS Index score, currently reports the
highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases of any
country.3 30 33 34 In fact, JEE Scores for both the USA and
the UK share the same inverse relationship with reported
COVID-19 outcomes.
There are several possible explanations for these
observed disparities. For example, while the USA does
maintain strong overall capacities for preventing,
detecting and responding to epidemic and pandemic
threats, ineffective federal leadership and an inability
to deploy available capacities may have precluded
a concerted whole-
of-
government response to the
pandemic. Still, despite a high overall score, some of
the USA’s category-
specific scores—specifically, those
in category 4 (health system) and category 6 (risk environment)—do, in fact, reflect these vulnerabilities. The
USA ranks 175th out of 195 countries on healthcare
access, 75th in the world for number of hospital beds and
earned a score of only 60.4/100 for clinic, hospital and
Ravi SJ, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e003648. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003648

community care capacity.35 Similarly, the USA ranks 59th
out of 195 countries on measures of socioeconomic and
political resilience and received a zero on measures of
public confidence in government.35 Thus, even in high-
scoring countries, weak governance, poor leadership
and inconsistent risk messaging could impede effective
implementation and coordination of core health security
functions during outbreak response. And, as we explain
further in the next section, country scores solely reflect
the presence or absence of critical health security capacities. They alone do not—and cannot—provide causal
explanations for reported health outcomes.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR GHS INDEX USERS
Some researchers have turned to the GHS Index to elucidate observed between-
country disparities in COVID19-associated morbidity, mortality and case fatality estimates.4 30 33 36 However, drawing simple correlations with
countries’ overall scores does not account for the fact
that these scores are meant to capture capacities spanning the breadth of the health security life cycle, from
outbreak prevention at the source, to early detection, to
rapid response. In other words, overall scores summarise
country capacities across all categories. However, countries with high overall scores may still have low category-
level, indicator-level and sub-indicator-level scores that
more strongly influence outbreak-associated outcomes.
Therefore, we encourage users wishing to analyse correlations between country scores and health outcomes to
examine scores at more granular levels, adjust model
weights to reflect country contexts and priorities and
consider more nuanced outcomes when analysing countries’ performances during outbreaks. For example, users
might examine relationships between category 2 (detection) scores and the number of misidentified or under-
reported cases in a given country, rather than examining
correlations between countries’ overall scores and absolute case counts.
Furthermore, we stress that implementation of health
security capacities is rarely—if ever—a linear process. In
other words, the mere presence of a given capacity does
not always translate predictably into a desired health
outcome or impact. Conceptualising health systems as
complex adaptive systems may offer more insight into the
varied pathways by which countries achieve public health
goals. Rickles et al37 note, for example, that single events
can have long-lasting effects on complex systems (‘history
matters’), a phenomenon known as path dependence.
Paina and Peters further explicate this point, describing
how path dependence can complicate health system
evolution, particularly in the context of rapidly changing
technology and when diverse stakeholders are involved—
as is the case in the global health security space.38 They
also highlight the futility of transposing health system
innovations from countries where they have succeeded
into countries with different political processes, or that
have not established the institutions or systems required
5

BMJ Glob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003648 on 8 October 2020. Downloaded from http://gh.bmj.com/ on October 21, 2020 by guest. Protected by copyright.

Given the demonstrated importance of transparency in coordinating effective multilateral responses to
pandemic threats, the GHS Index also prioritises publicly
available evidence of relevant capacities. Thus, countries
without publicly documented evidence of these capacities receive lower scores. The drawback of this approach
is that a country possessing a given capacity without
sharing corresponding evidence via official channels
may receive an artificially low score. To reduce the risk
of under-scoring, we invited government officials at 195
embassies and missions to the United Nations to review
our data with their respective National IHR Focal Points,
course-correct our work and share additional information. However, only 16 countries responded to these
requests, for which only minimal changes to scoring were
necessary.1
The GHS Index is underpinned by the principle that
‘a health threat anywhere is a health threat everywhere,’
an ethos championed by the architects of the GHSA.32
We believe that data describing national health security capacities should be a public good. In this spirit,
we anchored the GHS Index in publicly available data
and made the tool itself—and all its data—freely available. To ensure alignment with the JEE and integration
of all publicly available information shared by countries,
the GHS Index also draws heavily from WHO’s repository of publicly available JEE reports. Moving forward, we
strongly encourage all countries to document relevant
capacities publicly—both in the interest of global cooperation and transparency, and to improve the fidelity of
future monitoring efforts.

BMJ Global Health
lessons learnt since the original model was developed.
However, the GHS Index’s overarching finding still
holds true: that no country is sufficiently prepared for
epidemics or pandemics.1 The project team and International Panel of Experts fully anticipate that the GHS
Index will undergo iterative refinement as stakeholders
continue using the tool, identify shortcomings and learn
more about COVID-19 and other diseases that may
emerge in the future.
In light of the faults laid bare by COVID-19, we have
already begun reexamining indicators of leadership, trust
in government and political risk. The next iteration of
the GHS Index, slated to release in 2021, will also emphasise other indicators that COVID-19 has shown to be vital
for pandemic response, particularly those capturing state
capacity to sustain societal functioning during a major
outbreak. At present, we tentatively anticipate adding
metrics of government effectiveness, as well as measures
examining contact tracing and data sharing. We also
anticipate revising several existing questions and adding
over 20 new questions addressing zoonotic disease spillover events, scaling of testing capacities, abilities to test
for novel pathogens, non-pharmaceutical interventions,
private sector participation in exercises, risk communication, mis-information and disinformation, trade and
travel, health security financing, social cohesion, illicit
activities carried out by non-state actors, supply chains
for medical supplies, laboratory supplies and medical
countermeasures. Drawing further from the COVID-19
experience, we may also revisit weighting schemes for
select categories and indicators.
In the longer term, we hope that the global health security community examines bigger-picture methodological
issues around health security metrics. Many commonly
used indicators of health security capacity—including
those featured in the GHS Index, JEE and IHR Monitoring
and Evaluation Framework—reflect a highly technocratic
conceptualisation of outbreak prevention, detection and
response. This framing likely fails to account for many
social, institutional and cultural determinants of health
system functioning and population health.
Furthermore, many of the indicators featured across
all of these tools are investment-focused and capacity-
focused. Future monitoring and evaluation efforts might
benefit from deeper engagement with outcomes of health
systems-strengthening and health security-strengthening
efforts, such as health service coverage, health equity and
health system failures. Subsequent iterations of the GHS
Index specifically will have to contend with gaps in public
data availability that disproportionately affect scores in
LMICs. Inclusion of metrics capturing the quality and
making during a crisis might
effectiveness of decision-
strengthen the tool even further.

NEXT STEPS
Efforts are currently underway to further refine the GHS
Index based on constructive feedback from experts and

CONCLUSION
Our increasingly interconnected world is only as strong
as its weakest links. In the face of known, emerging

6
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for said innovations to succeed. This might further
explain why countries with similar levels of capacity
(as indicated by GHS Index scores) might nevertheless
report divergent COVID-19 outcomes.
Composite scores and quantitative correlations are thus
useful, but alone are insufficient tools for determining
causal relationships between health system capacities
and observed health outcomes. The GHS Index’s transparent accounting of country capacities across various
domains of health security is intended to function as a
gateway to more nuanced case study analyses, in-country
evaluations or after-action assessments that could help
elucidate the causal mechanisms underpinning observed
health outcomes during or after an outbreak. These
latter approaches are better-suited to answering why, with
respect to COVID-19, high-
scoring countries like the
USA, the UK, Sweden and Brazil have fared significantly
worse than similarly high-
ranked states like Thailand,
and even compared with lower-ranked states like New
Zealand, Vietnam and the Republic of Korea.
Such analyses of health system dynamics across specific
country contexts are beyond the scope of the GHS Index
itself, which solely monitors and documents the presence
or absence of critical health security capacities. Therefore, to maximise the utility of the GHS Index, users
should couple reviews of country scores with additional
modes of data collection and analysis to answer questions
regarding relationships between health capacities and
health outcomes. Such approaches might include key
country observations,
informant interviews, surveys, in-
case study analyses, focus groups or participatory action
research methods.
Importantly, users should also note that the GHS
Index is not a forecasting tool. Rather, it offers a cross-
sectional snapshot of countries’ health security capacities
as measured at one point in time. It cannot and does
not predict whether or how a country will leverage available capacities to mitigate an unfolding crisis, nor does
it make assumptions about the political decision-making
processes underpinning these efforts. Furthermore, the
inaugural GHS Index—which features data collected
between 2018 and 2019 and was released in September
2019—does not account for many countries’ efforts to
scale up testing and healthcare capacities in response
to COVID-19, nor whether these efforts could be readily
leveraged for future emergencies.
Finally, we reiterate that scores in all categories are
intended to provide a comprehensive snapshot, based on
publicly available data, of country capacities in these areas.
Scores and their accompanying justifications are meant
to inform—not supplant—country efforts to understrengthening
take JEEs and prioritise health security-
measures in their respective NAPHS.
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